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The destruction of millions of companion animals each year in 
animal shelters is often overlooked in conversations about animal rights, 
perhaps because these killings occur under the auspices of organizations 
committed to the welfare of animals and are necessitated by the acts and 
omissions of third parties. Moreover, such killings are universally justified 
by the assertion that a painless death is a lesser evil than other available 
alternatives. The entrenched belief that the alternatives are unambiguously 
worse has led to the interesting result that there has been little or no moral 
outcry against the widespread killing of companion animals in shelters. 
Alan Beck describes this curious phenomenon:  
For the animal welfare movement the major issue is 
not death, but suffering. Millions of dogs and cats 
are killed annually in animal shelters with the 
support of the humane movement, because of the 
perception that they are better off dead than 
suffering the indignities of homelessness. It is 
interesting that the notion "better off dead than 
underfed" has never been challenged by an animal 
equivalent of the "Right to Life" movement 
protecting the human's absolute right to live 
regardless of the circumstances (18-19). 
As Phyllis Wright puts it, "[w]e know that death, humanely administered, 
is not an evil, but a blessing to animals who are of no comfort to 
themselves or to the world because they are unwanted and suffering in 
isolation” (7). “Being dead,” she concludes, “is not a cruelty to animals" 
(8). Similarly, Tom Regan finds a way to bring shelter killings within the 
scope of his philosophy of animal rights: killing each unclaimed animal 
after a set period of time to make space for new homeless animals could 
be a "fair policy" for giving each animal "the same opportunity for a good 
life" where it is not realistic that each animal could actually experience a 
 Between the Species III August 2003 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
2
good life (1990, 213).  
  
In this paper, I will consider the ethical footing upon which such 
routinized killings stand. In doing so, I will examine the principal 
assertion by which such destructions gain moral acceptability in the 
animal rights and animal welfare communities--that they are necessary to 
save animals from consequences worse than death.  
  
When a dog is killed in an animal shelter, it is done (we will 
assume) professionally and painlessly, without any apprehension or 
foreboding on the part of the animal. Though not all shelter destructions 
conform to this model, for purposes of this paper I will consider only 
humane destructions in which well-trained and compassionate personnel 
end an animal's life quickly and painlessly. One instant the dog is being 
lovingly handled by caretakers, and in the next instant, the dog simply 
ceases to exist. Such "putting down" of companion animals has been 
written of in glowing, almost spiritual terms by some humane 
professionals. Ingrid Newkirk has suggested that, in many shelters, "the 
last moments in the hands of that technician, in the hands of the handler, 
have been the nicest moments that the animal has ever had" (94). Another 
writer describes a routine shelter killing as a positive experience, in which 
"this old dog's final thoughts are of being warm and secure in the arms of a 
trusted friend, of feeling sleepy, and then of nothing" (qtd. in Newkirk 252 
n. 9a). After reading such descriptions, one is forced to wonder whether 
such a relaxing and enjoyable death presents any sort of ethical problem at 
all. Yet the fact that even such an "ideal" killing elicits a measure of 
intuitive revulsion (at least when the dog in question is young, healthy, 
attractive, and good-natured) is suggestive. 
Philosophers have long wrestled with the question of whether a 
death which is both unexpected and painless constitutes a cognizable harm 
for the one who dies."Epicurus' dilemma," for example, purports to prove 
that death itself does not cause suffering for the one who dies, since a 
person cannot suffer from death while still alive, and cannot suffer from 
anything once dead (Sapontzis 172-73; Carruthers 74-75).Neither 
suffering nor fear (cognizable harms in their own rights) are involved in 
the paradigmatic shelter destruction.Yet if one imagines a human death 
that is similarly painless and unanticipated--Sapontzis gives the example 
of a young woman suddenly struck dead by a falling object as she walks 
down the street--it seems clear, as an intuitive matter, that the person who 
died has nonetheless suffered serious harm (172).  
The traditional way of explaining this intuition has been to focus 
on a different kind of harm which is caused by death even in the absence 
of fear, apprehension, pain, and suffering--the deprivation of opportunities 
for future enjoyment (Regan 1983, 99-100; Carruthers 77, 81-82). For 
humans, this takes the form of frustration of long-term projects and plans 
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predicated upon continued existence. While animals may not have detailed plans for the future, 
death nevertheless cuts off further opportunities for their enjoyment and 
satisfaction, and can from that standpoint be viewed as a harm (Carruthers 
81-82). Edward Johnson offers the example of a cow who enjoys chewing 
her cud, and who has an interest in continuing to have opportunities to 
engage in this pleasurable activity (128). Defined in this manner, the harm 
associated with premature death is a purely utilitarian one--further 
opportunities for pleasure are eliminated.  
Following this reasoning, painless killing would appear to be 
justifiable if there was good reason to believe that an animal's future 
existence would be primarily characterized by pain rather than pleasure. 
Yet even putting quality of life issues to one side, another objection 
appears which has continually plagued utilitarian thought. If the harm 
associated with a painless, unanticipated death derives solely from its 
result of depriving the subject of future satisfaction and enjoyment, then is 
not the same type of harm caused by efforts to prevent the formation of 
new life? Or, put differently, why is it considered morally preferable to 
prevent new lives from being formed than to painlessly extinguish lives 
presently in being?  
It is relatively easy to come up with an answer where humans are 
concerned. Humans have cognizance of their ongoing existence and 
development and are capable of formulating long-term plans for the future 
which assume their continued existence. These ongoing plans serve to 
"individualize" the experience of existence and make it nonfungible. The 
experiences of a new human being (however joyful they may be) cannot 
truly make up for the thwarting of these highly individualized plans. But, 
as Peter Singer has noted, this argument loses much of its force where 
animals are concerned: "[I]n the absence of some form of mental 
continuity it is not easy to explain why the loss to an animal killed is not, 
from an impartial point of view, made good by the creation of a new 
animal who will lead an equally pleasant life" (229).  
A variation of this argument, termed "the logic of the larder" or 
"the replacement argument" is one of the oldest and best-known 
justifications for the routinized raising and killing of animals for food (see 
Salt 185). In basic form, it runs as follows: Killing an animal is justified 
where the animal would not have existed but for the fact that humans have 
chosen to raise it, where its existence for even a short while is of positive 
value, and where, for every animal that is killed, another "replacement" 
animal is brought into being who would not have otherwise existed and 
who will enjoy its existence as much as the one that was killed (Sapontzis 
177; see Nozick 38). The horrific and absurd implications of applying this 
"logic" to human beings have been well noted; however, for the reasons 
discussed above, animals stand on fundamentally different footing insofar 
as they do not have a sense of their own continuing existence and cannot 
 Between the Species III August 2003 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
4
formulate long-term plans. Evelyn Pluhar offers an analogy to capture this view (a view which 
she herself rejects):  
When we kill and replace a merely conscious being 
by another such being, we are simply removing one 
disjointed, incoherent film from the projector and 
replacing it by another jumbled creation. . . . By 
contrast, when we kill a self-conscious being and 
replace that being with another, we are not just 
changing films: we are destroying the last reel of 
one coherent film in order to bring on an entirely 
different cinematic sequence. It is as if we lopped 
off the ending of Gone with the Wind in order to 
show the first half of Tarzan of the Apes, going on 
to interrupt the latter film with two-thirds of 
Jurassic Park and so on (200). 
It is even possible to argue, as Ruth Cigman has, that individual animals 
do not experience a desire to go on living, even though they may 
instinctively "clin[g] on to life" (57). As Edward Johnson explains, 
"[a]ccording to a common view, animals lack the concept of death, and so 
cannot mind death, any more than they mind not having a ticket to the 
opera" (128). 
Certain forms of utilitarianism are consciously constructed so as to 
dodge the problem of new life "making up for" loss of present life. These 
so-called "prior existence" varieties of utilitarianism take into account 
only lives currently in being when calculating utility; the creation of a new 
life does nothing to offset harm to an existing individual (Sapontzis 188). 
But while these forms of utilitarianism work fairly well when we are 
talking about human beings (if one ignores our obligations to future 
generations), they quickly become nonsensical in other contexts. For 
example, zoologists and biologists who are struggling to maintain a 
particular species of animal may care a great deal more about the "unborn" 
of that species than about the particularized lives currently in being. The 
species cannot survive unless it can successfully reproduce, and resources 
often must be channeled away from existing individual animals (especially 
those past reproductive age) to maximize the chances of sustaining the 
species as a whole (Lacy). Conflict may remain as to whether and when to 
"cull" animals to achieve these goals, but no one would suggest that the 
interests of future generations of animals are simply irrelevant.  
Alternatively, one can try to sidestep the replacement argument, as 
Sapontzis and Singer have in the related contexts of animals raised for 
food or laboratory use, by contending that it is of no practical consequence 
since the animals we consume and replace in this manner do not 
experience lives that are of positive value to them (Sapontzis 179; Singer 
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229). But dogs, unlike the factory-farmed animals that these authors have in mind, usually do 
experience lives that are worth living. Moreover, dogs are destroyed 
precisely because so many "replacement" dogs are being produced. Thus, 
even if there is a harm associated with cutting off a particular dog's 
opportunities for future enjoyment, there is by definition a new dog (or 
dogs) that has been created that are presumably just as capable of 
enjoyment as the dog destroyed. In fact, it can be argued that the most 
pleasurable portion of a dog's existence is its puppyhood, during which it 
is virtually assured a loving home and a surfeit of affection and attention. 
By that reasoning, society would be justified in putting dogs to death 
(painlessly, of course) as they reach adolescence so as to provide space for 
joyful (and much more greatly appreciated) puppies. 
If we swallow that logic, the painless destruction of individual 
dogs should be a matter of ethical indifference--less problematic, indeed, 
than the prevention of new litters. Yet the lengths to which humane 
organizations have gone in their efforts to make euthanasia less necessary 
through campaigns promoting the spaying and neutering of dogs and cats 
testify to the fact that euthanasia is viewed as standing on much different 
moral footing than the prevention of new births. Euthanasia (but not birth 
control) is also inconsistent with the fundamental mission of humane 
organizations--to meet the needs of any existing animal that comes 
through their doors in need. 
The high levels of stress reported by shelter workers who must 
routinely put pets down further attest to the fact that the activity is not 
really perceived as morally neutral--even by those who should have the 
largest stake in viewing it in such a manner (see Rollin 1988). Even those 
who strongly believe that euthanasia is the best available alternative are 
aware that carrying out the practice involves struggling against or 
unlearning fundamental moral teachings. As Ingrid Newkirk puts it, 
animal care professionals "have to struggle with our religious teachings. 
We have to struggle with the things we were taught as children, all the 
stuff that there is in our brain about death and about killing" (94). What is 
the basis for this initial moral reaction against which one must struggle in 
order to carry out routinized killing?  
 One might argue that the very fact that people feel distaste for 
such killings is reason enough to find it morally problematic.If it bothers 
people (never mind precisely why or how) it causes disutility to them, and 
that, from a utilitarian standpoint at least, is bad and worth avoiding. But 
since people can only be bothered by companion animal euthanasia when 
they know about it or are exposed to it, the "distaste" problem could be 
solved just as well by keeping the practice out of sight and out of mind. In 
fact, our society has done a fairly good job of keeping euthanasia in the 
background, so that the average citizen or pet owner rarely experiences 
any discomfort as a result of its existence. It is quite possible for animal 
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lovers to go through their entire lives without ever having occasion to darken the door of the 
local animal shelter. If the only harm we are troubling ourselves about is 
the one that occurs in the stomachs of sensitive souls, then the worst thing 
we can do is keep bringing up the issue. On that view, this paper is itself 
part of the problem, because it could cause otherwise happily oblivious 
persons to dwell on an upsetting topic.  
But if there are underlying causes for the discomfort--reasons why killing 
dogs is morally problematic independent of the discomfort the practice 
causes--then diverting people's minds away from the issue won't solve the 
ethical problem. A thought experiment offered by Peter Carruthers 
suggests that such underlying causes for moral discomfort may indeed 
exist (108-09). He posits a woman and a cat on a space ship which will 
never re-enter the earth's atmosphere, and which has lost all 
communication with Earth. In short, there is no way for anyone to know--
or be troubled by--anything that occurs in the capsule. He asks whether 
any ethical problem is presented if the woman chooses to use the cat as a 
dartboard. Our intuitive sense that this is very wrong may depend largely 
on the suffering which the cat would endure prior to its eventual death, but 
it highlights the difficulty associated with an out of sight, out of mind 
approach to ethics.  
One might alternatively argue that the question--whether the 
painless death of a companion animal presents an ethical problem--is a 
purely academic one, since such killings will always be necessary and are 
in any event performed to protect the animals in question from fates worse 
than death. Why agonize over whether a practice is "right" or "wrong" in 
the abstract if it will always be both necessary and morally preferable to 
other available alternatives? This can hardly be disputed in cases of severe 
injury or painful, untreatable illnesses. Indeed, one can even view 
euthanasia in these circumstances as carrying out the wishes that the 
animal himself would articulate if only he were able (Regan 1983, 113-
14). The killing of healthy dogs and puppies whose futures cannot reliably 
be predicted, however, presents a more complicated question (Brestrup 
36).  
There is no question, of course, that a humane end is preferable to 
many horrific alternatives that might otherwise await these healthy 
animals. Humane workers and veterinarians are well aware that depriving 
the public of an easy way to get rid of their unwanted pets "can lead to 
abandonment of the animals or do-it-yourself 'euthanasia,' such as the 
time-honored gunny-sack-off-the-bridge technique or even the release of 
animals onto the freeway" (Rollin 1988, 34). Compared with such 
alternatives, painless killing in a shelter indeed looks attractive. But does 
the presence of these alternatives make painless killing a matter of moral 
indifference?  
Perhaps not. Gary Francione, for one, has taken the position that a 
theory of animal rights is inconsistent with "compassionate" killings 
 Between the Species III August 2003 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
7
where "the decision is made to kill animals that do not absolutely require to be killed for 
reasons that would similarly justify the euthanasia of any moral agent" 
(1996, 108). It certainly seems inconsistent to grant a healthy animal 
something akin to "rights" (whatever that may mean) and then find the 
animal's destruction to be of no moral significance. But even from an 
animal welfare perspective, such killings--however humanely performed 
and however untenable the alternatives may be--still seem morally 
problematic.  
 Returning to the question of foreclosed possibilities for future 
enjoyment, it seems clear that the moral problem does not disappear 
simply because killing is morally preferable to the other available 
alternatives (putting aside for the moment the question of whether that is 
an accurate characterization of the situation). Where the circumstances 
that make the non-death alternative "worse than death" are the result of 
volitional human action (rather than, say, the progress of a disease or a 
chance automobile accident), the existence of a greater harm than death 
would not seem to provide absolution. If evil criminals take a person 
hostage, proceed to torture him, and then kill him (perhaps at his own 
anguished request), it would be absurd for them to offer as a defense to 
their actions the fact that they were, after all, only "putting him out of his 
misery." Nor would they be able to cite the fact that since the hostage's 
continued existence in their hands would consist only of torture, death was 
provided as the more desirable alternative. Such a death is unambiguously 
a murder, and no amount of philosophical sleight-of-hand can transform it 
into a mercy killing.  
Of course, shelter euthanasia (aside from the obvious fact that it 
involves animals rather than humans) differs from this example insofar as 
the persons creating the more horrible alternative and the persons 
engaging in the killing are not one and the same. It is more closely 
analogous to the mother who slips her child a cyanide pill as the pair are 
captured by persons whom she knows will, without a doubt, torture and 
ultimately kill them both. Such a killing is obviously not a matter of moral 
indifference either, even though it is done to avert a far more painful 
death, and even though the moral blame associated with it lies not with its 
immediate agent (the child's mother) but with the persons who threatened 
the greater harm. In this second example, in perceiving the death as 
harmful, one does not focus narrowly on the alternatives to death that were 
actually available at the time the mother made her decision (torture and a 
more painful death), but on the alternatives that would have been available 
absent the malevolent intervention of the evil criminals--that is, a normal 
life. Thus, euthanasia would seem to be morally problematic insofar as it 
cuts off the life that a pet could have enjoyed had he not been born into a 
society whose collective acts and omissions have resulted (we will assume 
for present purposes) in its inability to provide him with a life that is worth 
living.  
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The circumstances leading to the choice between death and "a fate worse than death" are 
not nearly as easy to trace where companion animals are concerned, and 
assigning moral blame becomes next to impossible. Is there anything 
morally reprehensible in a person who permits her unspayed female dog to 
breed with a random neighborhood dog, provides responsible prenatal and 
post-partum care, and then delivers the puppies to the local animal shelter? 
What if the shelter successfully places each of the puppies in adoptive 
homes? What if, by placing each of the puppies in adoptive homes, the 
shelter fails to place a number of other dogs and puppies already in the 
shelter who otherwise might have been placed? Does the moral status of 
the individual's actions depend upon how hard the shelter works (or how 
lucky they happen to be) in placing the offspring of her pet?  
Much of the difficulty in assessing blame stems from the fact that 
by virtue of their domesticated status, dogs are dependent upon human 
beings to affirmatively construct a life for them that does not involve 
suffering. Even the law has recognized this. Gary Francione cites a 
Georgia case in which the court reasoned that an owner must be permitted 
to kill his own dog, because otherwise he would be forced to bear 
"considerable burden[s]" to maintain the animal in accordance with the 
anti-cruelty statutes (1994, 764-65). As Bernard Rollin points out, "[i]f 
dogs were suddenly turned loose into a world devoid of people, they 
would be decimated" (1992, 220). Humans do not have to do anything 
mean-spirited to animals or directly cause them any suffering in order to 
contribute to a situation in which death emerges as the alternative of 
choice.  
Regardless of the mixture of acts and omissions responsible for the 
situation, the fact that painless killing emerges as the preferable alternative 
does not--and cannot--turn it into an act without moral significance. 
Nevertheless, animal sheltering professionals may well be acting morally 
when they put an unwanted animal to death, given their relevant choice-set 
at the point of decision. This presents a formidable conceptual and 
rhetorical difficulty. It is not easy to characterize the act of painless killing 
as a moral outrage while simultaneously maintaining its moral 
acceptability as a forced choice within an externally-imposed choice-set. 
Yet if the killing of companion animals is morally problematic, a frank 
acknowledgment of that fact is essential to efforts directed at lessening the 
need to resort to it.  
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